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Abstract
Background: All countries face challenging decisions about healthcare coverage. Malawi has committed to achieving
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2030, the timeframe set out by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As in other
low income countries, scarce resources stand in the way of more equitable health access and quality in Malawi. Its health
sector is highly dependent on donor contributions, and recent poor governance of government-funded healthcare saw
donors withdraw funding, limiting services and resources. The 2017 National Health Plan II and accompanying Health
Strategic Plan II identify the importance of improved governance and strategies to achieve more effective cooperation with
stakeholders. This study explores health sector stakeholders’ perceptions of the challenges to improving governance in
Malawi’s national health system within the post-2017 context of government attempts to articulate a way forward.
Methods: A qualitative study design was used. Interviews were conducted with 22 representatives of major international
and faith-based non-government organisations, civil society organisations, local government and government-funded
organisations, and governance bodies operating in Malawi. Open questions were asked about experiences and perceptions
of the functioning of the health system and healthcare decision-making. Content relating to healthcare governance was
identified in the transcripts and field notes and analysed using inductive content analysis.
Results: Stakeholders view governance challenges as a significant barrier to achieving a more effective and
equitable health system. Three categories were identified: accountability (enforceability; answerability;
stakeholder-led initiatives); health resource management (healthcare financing; drug supply); influence in
decision-making (unequal power; stakeholder engagement).
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Conclusions: Health sector stakeholders see serious political, structural, and financial challenges to improving
governance in the national health system in Malawi which will impact the government’s goal of achieving
UHC by 2030. Stakeholders identify the need for improved oversight, implementation, service delivery and
social accountability of government-funded service providers to communities. Eighteen months after the
introduction of the policy documents, they see little evidence of improved governance and have little or no
confidence in the government’s ability to deliver UHC. The difficulties stakeholders perceive in relation to
building equitable and effective healthcare governance in Malawi have relevance for other resource-limited
countries which have also committed to the goal of UHC.
Keywords: Healthcare governance, Malawi, Stakeholders, Universal health coverage, Social accountability, Health care
delivery, SDG 3, Low income countries
Background
Low-income countries face many essential healthcare
challenges, ranging from how to prioritise limited re-
sources to patchy service provision (both in terms of the
interventions available and geographical coverage) [1, 2].
In 2015, 193 United Nations (UN) member states, in-
cluding low income countries, became signatories of the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [3] and commit-
ted to the goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by
2030. Healthcare, and delivery of the SDGs more widely,
are underfinanced in low income countries, significantly
affecting service delivery, and making it highly unlikely
that the SDGs and UHC global targets will be achieved
by 2030 [1, 4–6]. Long-term challenges in the health sys-
tem can be understood through the lens of health sector
governance, not least because effective service delivery
depends on good healthcare governance [6, 7]. Govern-
ance, broadly, refers to the concept of institutional qual-
ity – the World Bank specifies that good governance
requires stakeholder voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption [8]. Yet, although
issues of service delivery in low income countries are
well documented, less attention has been paid to health-
care governance and its vital importance in managing re-
sources in resource-constrained environments.
Good governance in the health sector refers to the mak-
ing of pro-health legislation and frameworks for the im-
plementation of strategic policies combined with effective
regulation, monitoring, system design and social account-
ability [9]. According to the World Health Organization,
good governance of health requires: maintenance of the
strategic direction of policy development and implementa-
tion; monitoring the health system to detect adverse
trends in efficiency; advocating for health in national de-
velopment; regulating the behaviour of health stake-
holders, (including financers and healthcare service
providers); and establishing effective and transparent so-
cial accountability mechanisms. These are difficult to de-
liver in situations where resources, capacity, staffing and
infrastructure remain limited in practice and the health
system (financing and services) is often distributed (e.g.
between the government, donors, non-government orga-
nisations (NGOs) and faith-based providers). For this rea-
son, an essential route to improving the governance of the
health system in low income settings is through working
effectively with non-government stakeholders [10, 11].
Health stakeholders can be defined as organisations
and individuals involved in the production, consump-
tion, management, regulation or evaluation of a specific
health activity, including governance of the health sys-
tem or health policy development [12]. Eliciting stake-
holder perspectives allows healthcare to be seen from
multiple angles, enabling exploration of differences and
similarities in the understanding of specific issues (e.g.
health services or policies) and perceived health needs of
different individual stakeholders or groups (e.g. policy-
makers versus service users) [12, 13]. This research can
be used to influence the development or refinement of
new policies, services and governance processes, includ-
ing those focused on delivering UHC [13, 14].
The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the chal-
lenges of health information monitoring and inequalities
of access in low income countries with weak health sys-
tems and without UHC [15, 16]. In both the developing
and developed world, there are now citizen calls both for
more urgent responses to the pandemic, for UHC and ac-
countability of governments for their responses [17, 18]. It
is therefore particularly relevant at this time to explore the
tensions between governments and stakeholders in rela-
tion to the capacity of the health system to respond to
pressing health needs (e.g. financing, workforce capacity,
resource distribution, access to medicines) as limitations
in these areas critically affect capacity to respond to major
health crises, whilst failures to do so can further under-
mine and weaken health systems [19–21].
We use Malawi, a UN member, as a case study for in-
vestigating perceived challenges in healthcare govern-
ance and health system functioning in low income
countries moving towards UHC.
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Malawi context
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world [22].
It has low per capita spending on health of 39.2 USD,
which is significantly lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa
average of 98 USD [23]. The Government of the Republic
of Malawi has signed the Abuja Declaration to commit at
least 15% of the national budget to health [24], but only al-
located 9.8% in 2018. As a low-income country with lim-
ited tax revenue, a higher health allocation would still
deliver an under-funded health system [25]. For example,
for the period 2012/13–2014/15, the government only
accounted for an average 25.5% of the total health expend-
iture (and households for 12.9% i.e. direct payment for
health services) [24]. However, it is worth noting that
health gains can be achieved with limited resources -
Malawi was one of few countries to meet the Millennium
Development Goal for child health [26].
In 2017, the government produced the National
Health Policy II (NHP II), which is closely aligned with
SDG 3 (ensure healthy lives and wellbeing for all at all
ages) [27]. In this, UHC is defined as ‘a situation where
all people have access to quality essential healthcare ser-
vices and essential medicines and vaccines without suf-
fering undue financial hardship as a result of accessing
care’. The policy specifies the following objectives, to be
met between 2017 and 2030, to strengthen the health
system and achieve UHC:
1. Improve service delivery by ensuring UHC of
essential health care services, paying particular
attention to vulnerable populations.
2. Provide effective leadership and management that is
accountable and transparent at national, and local
authority levels.
3. Increase health financing equitably and efficiently
and enhance its predictability and sustainability.
4. Improve availability of competent and motivated
human resources for health for effective, efficient,
quality and equitable health service delivery.
5. Improve the availability, accessibility and quality of
health infrastructure, medical equipment, medicines
and medical supplies at all levels of healthcare.
6. Reduce risk factors to health and address social
determinants of health and health inequalities.
7. Strengthen capacity in health research and health
information system management for evidence-based
policy-making.
However, concerns have been raised (e.g. in academic
and media outlets in 2019) about the predictability and
sustainability of the health system, especially in its ability
to finance and achieve its health objectives, including
UHC [28–30]. For example, significant improvements in
service delivery cannot be made whilst the staff vacancy
rate for healthcare facilities remains very high (50%) and
some communities are up to 35 km away from their
nearest facility [29, 30].
Healthcare delivery is mainly via government facilities
(63%), which have some service limitations but are free
at the point of access. Healthcare is also delivered by the
Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM; 26%)
for a small user fee, and by private for-profit and civil
society providers (11%) [28]. The health system is highly
dependent on donors. In 2014/15 donor aid contributed
53.5% of the nation’s total health expenditure. However,
this was down from 68.3% in 2012/13 due to donors
withdrawing direct financing (via a basket fund) for the
Ministry of Health’s (MoH) strategic and implementa-
tion plans in response to a financial corruption scandal
that broke in 2013, known as Cashgate [28]. This ero-
sion of donor confidence produced an accountability cri-
sis across the health sector. The financial arrangements
and trust between civil society organisations (CSOs) and
donors were also adversely affected, as donors feared
widespread government corruption within the govern-
ment and non-government health system.
The government recognises the essential role of gov-
ernance in enforcing and monitoring the actions re-
quired to achieve their health objectives, and leadership
and governance were identified as priority areas in the
Health Sector Strategic Plan II 2017–2022 (HSSP II)
[24]. This is the strategic framework for the NHP II
which focuses on strengthening governance in the health
sector to improve efficiency and optimise existing re-
sources (human, financial, material), particularly by im-
proving the domestic financing mechanisms. The
Minster for Health acknowledges that the country’s
health sector is highly dependent on external financing,
and the vital importance of continued aid to support
health gains. Demonstrating improved governance, in-
cluding building better relationships with stakeholders,
is essential for rebuilding the damaged relationship be-
tween the government and donors in order to achieve
continued donor contributions and a more coordinated
approach to the funding and provision of healthcare in
Malawi [10, 24].
There have been, consequently, a series of measures to
improve the governance of the health sector. For ex-
ample, in 2018 the MoH created the new role of hospital
ombudsman to ensure better service delivery in public
and CHAM health facilities with greater social account-
ability between the facilities and communities via im-
proved connections between the service users and
providers [31]. However, significant concerns regarding
health sector governance, particularly around financial
and resource efficiencies, and tensions between govern-
ment stakeholders remain [32], some of which we ex-
plore in this paper. Given the commitment of the
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government to improve healthcare governance, outlined
in the NHP II and HSSP II, identifying these challenges
is critical, yet, to our knowledge, no previous research
has investigated the concerns of people operating within
the health sector in Malawi and the issues they perceive
as the challenges to better governance and thus to
greater health system efficiency. Further, none has
reflected upon the synergies between Malawian health
policy and healthcare governance in practice.
Methods
We reported our research using the Consolidated criteria
for Reporting Qualitative research (COREQ) checklist
[33]. Our study has an exploratory qualitative study de-
sign, with largely unstructured interviews conducted with
a range of health stakeholders. We opted to speak to
stakeholders individually, rather than through focus
groups, due to the potentially sensitive nature of the topic
when many stakeholders work closely with the govern-
ment. This allowed us to be certain that when stake-
holders repeated concerns, they were expressing their own
opinions and not being led by the reflections of others.
Participants
Using a purposive sampling strategy, health stakeholders
working in decision-making or regulatory roles in the
government-funded health system or who have advocated
for change in the health sector at the government-level
were identified via a mapping exercise and invited to
interview. Using their local and specialist knowledge from
conducting health research in low income countries, and
in Malawi specifically, AM and Thanzi la Onse project
partners in the College of Medicine at the University of
Malawi and the Oversees Development Institute identified
government and non-government institutions providing
health services or performing healthcare governance activ-
ities and located in Malawi [34, 35]. This was supple-
mented by electronic searches of health sector websites
and registries (such as the register of the Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations and delegate lists from
health conferences and workshops) and searching health-
related newspaper articles in The Nation and The Times.
Key individuals (n = 22) within these institutions and lo-
cated in Lilongwe and Blantyre were identified. These
urban locations were selected for logistical reasons and
due to limited resources.
We performed 22 face-to-face interviews in a private
space in the participants’ place of work, the preferred lo-
cation of all participants. Everyone approached for inter-
view consented to participate. The sample consisted of
representatives from the organisation types: international
NGOs (n = 3); faith-based NGOs (n = 2); CSOs (n = 9);
local government and government-funded organisations
(n = 6); and governance bodies (n = 2). We sought a
range of rural and urban, government, community, and
citizen level perspectives. We included central and dis-
trict level representatives as, due to decentralisation, the
Blantyre and Lilongwe District Health Offices are not
part of central government or the referral health system.
Including the district level also provided perspectives of
healthcare delivery in rural settings, as the districts in-
clude significant rural (and socioeconomically deprived)
populations. The CSO and governance bodies engaged
directly with citizens, community groups and civil rights
movements/projects.
Data collection
Ethical approval for the study was received from both
the University of York (6 July 2018) and from the Col-
lege of Medicine in the University of Malawi (16 Octo-
ber 2018). The interviews were conducted by AM in a
combination of English and Chichewa between Decem-
ber 2018 and February 2019.
As the research was exploratory, open questions
were asked in order to capture each person/organisa-
tion’s experience and perception of the functioning of
the health system and healthcare decision-making in
Malawi. Guiding questions were set by AM and JG
and reviewed by the ethics committees. For example,
describe the role of your department/institution in
the resource allocation process; what challenges do
you see in Malawi’s health sector? A semi-structured
interview schedule (Supplementary material 1) was
used to enable the eliciting of further detail on topics
of importance to the interviewee, including govern-
ance (which was raised to some extent by every
interviewee). Accordingly, and given the diverse stake-
holders, the questions varied in each interview.
Each interviewee was informed as to the purpose of
the research and given an information sheet before giv-
ing signed consent to participate in the interview study.
Six consented to audio recording via dictaphone. The re-
mainder (n = 16; 72.3%) consented to field notes with
the possibility of citing direct quotations but not audio
or video recording as they wanted to speak freely and
without concern for government (or employer/colleague)
reprisal. Guidelines for making field notes and their inte-
gration with study data were followed [36]. The verbatim
transcribed recordings and field notes (with direct quo-
tations) for the non-recorded interviews comprise the
transcripts used in the analysis. Due to the potentially
politically sensitive nature of the content, every effort
has been made to anonymise the individual participants
in the reporting of this research. Attribution is made by
type of organisation and participant number only.
The interviews lasted between 45 min and 1.5 h.
Masefield et al. BMC Health Services Research         (2020) 20:1142 Page 4 of 16
Data analysis
Where necessary, the transcripts were translated into
English by AM. Once all the interviews had been con-
ducted, the analysis was performed by SM using induct-
ive thematic analysis, whereby the coded categories were
derived directly from the data (rather than the data be-
ing coded to support a pre-existing theory) [37, 38]. This
is an iterative process of abstraction where units of the
data (words, sentences and paragraphs from the inter-
view transcripts and field notes) relating to the broad
topic of healthcare governance were identified and com-
bined/grouped with similar content to form major cat-
egories and subcategories [39, 40]. This was an
appropriate approach for an exploratory study on a topic
with no known studies [37].
The exploratory study design and analysis were ex-
pected to produce a list of perceived governance issues,
grouped into categories. Given the breadth of the data ex-
pected, we did not seek during the interviews or the ana-
lysis to identify the extent to which different interviewees
or organisation types agreed on specific potential govern-
ance issues. For this reason, a data saturation approach
was not used in the analysis. Governance issues raised by
one or more people are reported. Where available, direct
quotations are used to illustrate interviewee perceptions.
Elsewhere, impressions and scenarios described by the in-
terviewees and recorded in the field notes are presented
and attributed with participant numbers.
The analysis was performed between November 2019
and January 2020 in Nvivo 12 software.
Results
Although there was some overlap, three major categories
(seven subcategories) of perceived governance issues were
identified: accountability (enforceability; answerability;
stakeholder-led initiatives); health resource management
(healthcare financing; drug supply); and influence in
decision-making (unequal power; stakeholder engagement).
Accountability
Stakeholders identified limitations in the accountability
of the government to health stakeholders in both the
spheres of enforcement (of health decisions made) and
answerability (for the impact of these decisions). Chal-
lenges focused on the inadequate implementation of
health policy and insufficient answerability mechanisms.
These included absent implementation plans, poor dis-
semination of national policy to other levels of health-
care (regional, city, service), limited processes to provide
a feedback mechanism between service providers and
the government and citizen review in government health
policy and governance structures. In response to the per-
ceived inadequacies of government-led healthcare gov-
ernance, initiatives led by service-providers, NGOs and
CSOs have emerged to hold the government to account
for their health policy decisions and poor resource
management.
Enforceability
An interviewee from a healthcare governance body stated
‘there is always a big difference between the rosy policies
or strategies and implementation. Implementation leaves
a lot to be desired’ (Participant(P)21). The CSOs shared
this view (P6, P9, P11, P13), with one identifying a nation-
wide need for more affordable, available and accessible
health services, but ‘these issues are not very clear in the
strategic plan and policy’ (P6). It was considered highly
unlikely that improvements would be made without a
policy-level commitment to making advances in these
areas combined with a clearly defined (monitored and
enforced) implementation plan: ‘beyond development of
strategies and policies, have they thought about resolving
the current recurring problems? (P9)’. This interviewee
also referred to the need for greater governance of the
drug supply chain and human resources (discussed under
‘health resource management’).
A specific example of poor governance was the
Charter on Patients’ and Health Service Providers’ Rights
and Responsibilities which was developed by the MoH
together with CSOs but was never implemented (P13).
Thus, there is a government commitment to the protec-
tion of human rights in the service delivery context, but
little public awareness of these rights and they are not
protected in practice. Others found the implementation
of policy to be ad hoc. For example, there have been
sporadic visits by District Health Officers to CHAM fa-
cilities to monitor compliance with government stan-
dards in accordance with the service level agreements
(SLAs) (P5).
The partial implementation of the government policy
of decentralisation was viewed as a cause of poor gov-
ernance in the health sector (P15, P19, P20). The move
to devolve power from the government to local level au-
thorities (district and city) had resulted in greater
budgetary constraints at these levels with limited dis-
semination of government policy via implementation
guidelines. The city assemblies were not mentioned in
the health policies or HSSP II and had not been involved
in developing or reviewing them. The representative felt
this was short-sighted of the government as implementa-
tion of the Essential Health Package (EHP; the package
of essential services identified by the government as the
starting point for the move towards UHC), ‘cannot be
successful without the active input and involvement of
the city assemblies’ as the cities are ‘hosting a significant
portion of the population’ (P15). Further, the local au-
thorities felt unable to implement the government pol-
icy: ‘in reality, each district orders drugs based on the
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local needs and dynamics. The EHP in the HSSP II pro-
vides an ideal scenario, but in practice we have to re-
spond to local realities’ (P19).
Concerns were also raised from within a government
governance body, where it was felt that the knowledge,
skills and motivation of the members of these bodies/
committees could determine the extent to which the
government is held to account: ‘the functioning of the
committee relies on expertise of the members [ …] we
have to be proactive to facilitate the changes that the
country needs’ (P21). When the Chair or membership
changes, the body could, therefore, become less effective.
The lack of routine and comprehensive communication
between the different governance bodies was also men-
tioned as a weakness:
‘[we have] not previously engaged with the parlia-
mentary committee on health, although they are an
important player in the accountability for health.
However, they have interacted only at the launch of
the NHP II, which cannot be considered as formal
or in depth engagement’ (P22).
One instance where the communication procedure has
been formalised (and is reported as greatly improved as
a result) is between the Office of the Ombudsmen and
the hospital ombudsmen (P22).
Answerability
Efforts to provide answerability mechanisms and their
limitations were discussed. These included processes to
provide a feedback link between service providers and
the government and the extent of citizen review in gov-
ernment health policy and governance structures.
Frustration was expressed about the lack of citizen-
level awareness and advocacy for greater government so-
cial accountability (P21, P8). A representative of a
government-funded governance body stated that the
process of parliamentary committee reviews is respon-
sive, whereby issues are brought to their attention, trig-
gering a review. However, they found that ‘Malawians
are not proactive in demanding the committee’s legisla-
tive intervention’, giving the example of the Mental
Health Act, which they said was out of date, yet no one
has requested a review or amendment (P21).
NGO and CSO representatives remarked on a sense of
apathy towards governance among the general popula-
tion (P2, P8). A Malawian representative of an inter-
national NGO stated:
‘the problem with most Malawians is that they view
human rights as a charity or a favour, not as an en-
titlement. When government fails to uphold or pro-
tect their rights, they therefore are not to demand
rights as an entitlement that they ought to have.
That way, issues like poor service delivery continue
without any consequences’ (P2).
They criticised the government and courts for not
clarifying the ‘state obligations in the protection of the
right to health’ and the lack of discussion on the impact
of economic, social and cultural rights on health (P2).
Conversely, it was also felt that when NGOs and CSO
representatives did try to increase government recogni-
tion of specific health needs, the government response
was tokenistic - it did not result in sustainable changes
to health policy or effective implementation. For ex-
ample, in response to civil society advocacy efforts, drugs
for a vulnerable patient group were purchased by the
government via the parliamentary committee for health.
However, ‘it was a once off reactive purchase’, the supply
was insufficient for the demand, and there was no distri-
bution plan so the drugs could only be accessed via two
hospitals in Lilongwe (P3). There was apparently no ef-
fective mechanism by which the group could seek an in-
dependent review of the situation.
There was, however, some evidence of government ef-
forts to roll out accountability measures reportedly
backed by the public. The Office of the Ombudsman
had ‘shifted its focus towards service delivery by system-
atically reviewing institutional processes to recommend
corrective measures’ (P22). Interns, being trained as hos-
pital ombudsmen, had been placed in all four central
(government-run) hospitals after ‘positive media report-
ing resulted in public and institutional demands for the
idea to be spread to the central hospitals’ (P22). The rep-
resentative of the governance body who gave this ex-
ample also remarked that by recruiting and training up
interns specifically for the role, they would not be
current or previous MoH staff, thus implying a degree of
impartiality. However, a structural issue remained as the
ombudsmen report back (and are junior to) the District
Health Officer, who has decision-making authority in
district administration, ‘it is therefore very difficult for
the subordinates to play watchdog over their seniors,
even more difficult to sanction or report them for any
wrongdoing’ (P22).
There was further evidence of collaboration between
the government and other health stakeholders in MoH
governance processes. For example, an NGO provided
technical support to the government by placing local
and international technical experts in the MoH as advi-
sors (but the initiative ended in 2016 when the funding
expired) (P2). Another NGO sits on the MoH’s Commu-
nity Health Technical Working Group (TWG) to con-
tribute expertise on how to build an effective
community health system (although they approached the
MoH to request to be on the group rather than being
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invited to participate) (P1). The Malawi Health Equity
Network (MHEN) is routinely consulted by the MoH,
attending regular and ad hoc meetings, and participating
in TWGs (P11). However, not all CSOs are members or
feel represented by MHEN:
‘the challenge with MoH’s engagement with NGO
stakeholders is that they assume that MHEN is the
representative of all health NGOs, but not all NGOs
doing work in the area of health are members of
MHEN. The organisation’s view is that MHEN can’t
replace grassroots voices in the engagement with
the MoH. MHEN does not have capacity to repre-
sent all voices, simply impossible’ (P13).
Stakeholder-led initiatives
In the absence of adequate social accountability, exam-
ples were given of how service providers, NGOs and
CSOs sought to hold the government to account for lim-
itations in the health system. For example, in response
to poor government-led governance of healthcare facil-
ities and service inefficiencies, service providers had in-
troduced structures to increase accountability at the
service-level and in their interactions with the MoH (P4,
P5, P17, P22). Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital sought
greater autonomy from the government by establishing
their own information management system and is seek-
ing registration as a public trust. To this end, an inde-
pendent consultant has been engaged to assess the
readiness and capacity of the hospital, and they have
prepared trust deeds, a constitution, and Terms of Refer-
ence for the board (required documents for registration
of public trusts with the Registrar General) (P17).
Another approach was to include MoH representatives
on the key management boards of the service providers,
thus facilitating direct and ongoing communication with
the MoH via a designated person. By including a MoH
representative on CHAM’s boards, the ongoing issues of
funding deficits and drug stockouts (when required drugs
are not available at healthcare facilities) would be fed back
to the government, and hopefully addressed, more
promptly (P5). They successfully lobbied the government
to establish a joint SLA Unit whose sole purpose is to
communicate with the facilities, monitor the contracts,
pay facility staff directly and respond to any issues (P5).
Part of the Unit’s role is to visit the healthcare facilities to
review the challenges. Further, CHAM now insist on
Memorandums of Understanding with the government to
ensure that each of their facilities is the only government-
registered and recognised facility in that area (P5). This
protects them from the government stipulation that fund-
ing can be withdrawn if healthcare facilities are within
a 5 km distance of each other.
Efforts were also being made by NGOs and CSOs to
increase the social accountability of the government to
the public through advocacy and monitoring activities
and training (P3, P8, P12). Direct action included pres-
suring the MoH to respond to health-related incidents,
such as aggravated attacks on people with specific health
conditions (e.g. albinism) (P3) and for the inclusion of
‘neglected health issues in the national health responses’
(P13). This had resulted in the introduction of a new
MoH TWG which includes consideration of these health
issues alongside those already receiving a significant
focus (e.g. HIV/AIDS) (P13). Other advocacy initiatives
were targeted at the national and local government
levels and service providers (e.g. hospitals). These in-
cluded calling on the government to increase the health
budget to the level expected under the Abuja Declar-
ation (P9, P11) and educating the public in the need for
greater social accountability, thus creating a demand
(P8). It was felt that the courts should have (but had
not) taken an active role in clarifying the ‘state obliga-
tions in the protection of the right to health’ (P2). There
were efforts to highlight this and to raise awareness
among the public that they can use the court system to
demand health services (P8).
Another approach used was to demonstrate to the
community the value of specific services with time-
limited funding to mobilise them to become accountable
for these services and demand the government provide
ongoing access (P12). Training initiatives aimed to equip
communities and individuals in local government and
health service delivery (e.g. health advisory and health
centre management committees, faith-based NGO and
district health management teams, local government
councillors) with skills in budget analysis and monitor-
ing to become advocates for governance and hold to ac-
count the service providers that they interact with (P8,
P11). For example, manuals have been developed to
train service providers on upholding the human rights of
vulnerable groups during service delivery (e.g. women,
children and sexual minorities) (P8).
Collaboration with other organisations was perceived
as strengthening the advocacy efforts of CSOs, such as
calling for greater governance to prevent corruption in
the health sector. For example, one group found that
membership of an international NGO network gave
them support with developing a strategic plan to advo-
cate for the creation and adoption of a national response
plan in a neglected disease area (P13). Other groups
formed a coalition to become the patient voice in gov-
ernment consultation exercises (P8, P11) or lobby inter-
national NGOs and donors to advocate for their
interests (e.g. drug safety and more health professionals
working in their disease area) as they are believed to
have more influence with the government and can raise
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awareness at the international level (P12). These collabo-
rations are also conducting independent monitoring of
the national health system and looking at how the gov-
ernment is meeting its legal and policy obligations to
publicly hold the government to account for its actions
and interventions (or lack of them). For example, moni-
toring progress towards achieving the UHC target (P8),
monitoring the extent to which health interventions spe-
cified in the MoH’s policies are being implemented
(P11), and assessing whether the health budget approved
by Parliament is being implemented (as there is a known
deficit in the amount spent versus the amount allocated)
(P8, P11, P18). Periodic service delivery satisfaction sur-
veys are also conducted to hold government-funded ser-
vice providers to account for the quality of the care they
deliver (P11).
Health resource management
Most of the challenges to the governance of health resources
arose from underfunding (whether due to the insufficient al-
location of funds or corruption) and a lack of interconnectiv-
ity (communication and resource distribution) between the
different levels of the health system. Specific instances of
poor governance were identified for drug supply, exacerbated
by the fragmented health system.
Healthcare financing
It was acknowledged by several interviewees that a lack of
allocated and available (due to low domestic revenue)
funding hindered improvements in the health system in
general, and governance specifically (P22). The city assem-
blies do not receive funding from government as they re-
ceive locally generated revenue (city or property rates,
licences, and service charges). This produces insufficient
funds to meet the health needs that the city assembly are
mandated to provide: 1) public cleansing services (e.g.
waste management, cemetery services); and 2) preventa-
tive community health services (e.g. family planning
clinics, health education, pest and infection control, HIV
prevention and treatment) (P15, P20). Further, the lack of
government funding received by the City Assemblies was
flawed as it ‘overlooks the reality of disease or health bur-
dens’. The example provided was cholera outbreaks, which
typically spread from rural Lilongwe to more urban areas,
‘yet the City Assembly is expected to bear the cost when
the crisis hits the urban population’ (P20). It was felt that
the City Assemblies should receive some funds from the
Ministry of Local Government as the ‘urban populations
also pay for other taxes and must get returns through the
national budget’ (P20).
When the District and City Assemblies are located
in the same city (as in Lilongwe and Blantyre) it was
argued that:
‘the District Health Office should be doing more to
fill in the gaps [in the City Assemblies’ funding/ser-
vice provision]. But bearing in mind the financial
limitation of the District Assemblies and the District
Health Offices, that is a consideration for the City
Assembly letting them get away with not covering
all the gaps’ (P15).
Accordingly, the health policy cannot be enforced be-
cause the City and District Assemblies cannot be made
to provide services which they cannot fund. This leads
to a mutual acceptance of substandard service delivery
at multiple levels. Furthermore, local government repre-
sentatives expressed frustration at not receiving clearer
guidance about resource allocation from the MoH. The
government determined the structure for decentralised
health resource allocation - health resources are to be
decided at the district level by the District Health Allo-
cation Committee - but did not issue any guidance on
the composition of the committee or its role in health
resource allocation at the regional level (P19). The infer-
ence being that it was inefficient for each district to de-
velop their own guidelines and results in inadequate
committees.
Issues were also identified between the government
and service providers. The government has SLAs with
CHAM, paying them to provide healthcare facilities,
hospitals and training of healthcare professionals. How-
ever, the government frequently fails to meet their con-
tractual obligations:
‘through CHAM we signed what we call them ser-
vice level agreements, but are they fully adhered to
fully? Not really. But we still have to keep on like
providing the services because we are also respon-
sible to the communities that we are in’ (P2).
On some occasions, the MoH has delayed payment to
CHAM by 4 months (accumulated non-payment without
warning/agreement) (P5). In some facilities this has re-
sulted in a poorer quality of service delivery as the staff
and essential running costs cannot be paid and drugs
purchased (P5):
‘the government is currently failing to honour
agreements by defaulting on payments to some of
the facilities and as a result, citizens whose only op-
tion is to go to CHAM facilities to access health ser-
vices are being turned back because the hospitals
won’t offer free services until the government has
paid’ (P8).
Conversely, despite the MoH’s funding constraints, it
was reported that one government-funded organisation
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was able to renegotiate additional funding after the
budget ceiling for the year had been set. They received
an extra 1 million US dollars by arguing that the allo-
cated budget has a serious shortfall and ‘downscaling
would have resulted in public dissatisfaction and dimin-
ishing of public support’ (P18). Thus, top-up funding
may be possible for organisations who know how to ap-
proach and argue their case with the government.
Three interviewees perceived corruption as the greatest
ongoing challenge to an effective health system (P2, P8,
P9). For example, ‘the problem with our health system
may not be about insufficient resources’, inferring that
theft and corruption are responsible for the resourcing is-
sues (P9). There was criticism of the government for seek-
ing to introduce user fees to secure additional revenue for
the health system, but which would not address the
underlying issue of poor resource management:
‘Failure of Malawi’s health system is about corrup-
tion because the financial systems are porous. Once
we address that problem, then we can talk about
whether people can pay user fees. There are many
ways to increase availability of resources by avoiding
wastage. Malawian people are poor and additional
payments won’t address the problem of system fail-
ures or drug stockouts. Drug stockouts are a symp-
tom of a dysfunctional system than insufficiency of
funding. Even if the idea of user fees was accepted
and implemented, there has to be someone to col-
lect the pay and manage the funds. In the current
situation, the funds would create more problems
than solutions’ (P2).
It was stated that improvements to the national health
system will not be possible until governance is strength-
ened at the national and district government levels to
tackle ‘the fact that significant health moneys are lost to
theft and corruption on areas such as supply of mate-
rials, drug procurement, contracts for construction of
health facilities money’ (P8).
Drug supply
The availability of medical drugs and particularly drug
stockouts were the issues raised by the greatest number
of interviewees (P1, P4, P7, P9, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17,
P20). Stockouts were attributed to limited government
funding for drugs, a fragmented drug procurement sys-
tem, inadequate drug supply and distribution, theft, and
political disinterest in providing drugs and medical de-
vices to specific vulnerable groups e.g. people with albin-
ism, prisoners and LGBT communities. For example,
‘there is lack of resources to fund disease’ treatment for
prisoners. Health of prisoners is not a priority’ (P7) and
‘there are always drug stockouts, yet we continue with
the same inefficient supply chain’ (P9). When there are
drug shortages, ‘the patients have to find money and buy
medicines which they have been prescribed’ (P16).
The government’s drug policy is that they have ‘a final
say on what to do with the drugs, where to distribute
them and how to distribute’ (P16). Some drugs are in-
cluded in the EHP, but additional drugs may need to be
procured for conditions not covered (P4, P19). The gov-
ernment was perceived as not understanding the differ-
ences in the needs of different communities: ‘in reality,
each district orders drugs based on the local needs and
dynamics. The EHP in the HSSP II provides an ideal
scenario, but in practice we have to respond to local
realities’ (P19). The government was considered impervi-
ous to variation in population needs - even when evi-
dence of a need for drugs/medical devices can be
provided using information management systems, the
government had failed to respond:
‘there is insufficient availability of lubricants and den-
tal dams. There should be coordination to estimate
the needs and purchase the sufficient amounts. [We
have] statistics on the need of lubes and the state
should use the supply-returns [the system for ac-
counting for lubricants distributed] and the state can
purchase based on the trends from it’ (P14).
The government requires that all national health sys-
tem drug-procurement is via the Central Medical Stores
(CMS) or their approval is sought before using other
sources or distributing donations (P5). When this pro-
cedure is followed the supply can be poor, sometimes
drugs are available in the CMS but not received by the
hospitals (P13). There were calls from the interviewees
for an improved system to coordinate between the CMS
and the hospital pharmacies, and better auditing of
drugs at healthcare facilities (P4, P13). In reality, drugs
are accessed from a variety of sources i.e. the CMS, Dis-
trict Health Officers, donors and disease-specific pro-
grams (P5) and CHAM all use their preferred suppliers
as an alternative to the CMS (P5, P15). For example,
‘since the city assembly is autonomous, they have at
times decided to purchase from preferred local suppliers’
and ‘we have prequalified suppliers each and every year
then we negotiate the prices and we buy our own drugs’
(P15). Further, when the service providers receive dona-
tions of drugs (including prenatal multivitamin tablets
for pregnant mothers) from ‘international well-wishers’
they are supposed to consult the government about dis-
tribution but instead, they distribute them as they see fit,
according to the needs of the community (P15). Other
providers refuse them as ‘the drugs received are based
on donor preferences. The MoH has given District
Health Officers powers to refuse drugs which are not
Masefield et al. BMC Health Services Research         (2020) 20:1142 Page 9 of 16
needed because it costs more to receive drugs that will
not be used’ (P19).
This fragmented system of different facilities procuring
drugs from different suppliers requires effective informa-
tion management. One NGO was developing an infor-
mation management system to harmonise the supply
chain across their facilities by getting an ‘overall picture
of supply of medicines (P1). They described the scale of
the project:
‘to support harmonisation of the system including
all drugs that run through the system, and donor-
run supply chains e.g. USAID’s global Health Supply
Chain. The government system ideally should take
account of drugs that are procured by development
partners [donors]. Ideally, a country should have
one drug procurement agent but the current system
in the country is chaotic’ (P1).
Influence in decision-making
The health stakeholders interviewed consistently felt that
they did not have any power to influence healthcare
decision-making, particularly in the development of
health policy (the NHP II and HSSP II); whilst donors
were perceived as exerting a, largely positive, governing
influence over the government.
Unequal power
Examples of unequal power and its impact in different
health system contexts (governance bodies, services,
donor-government relations) were identified.
A human rights organisation with a health-focus spoke
of a lack of political will for greater governance as the
reason why corruption and financial irregularities in
construction contracts for healthcare facilities (which are
centralised and led by the MoH) occurred, ‘government
has enough authority over public services, but political
will is crucial for things to work’ (P8). The deficit in
health sector governance is exacerbated by a lack of top-
down leadership:
‘the systems for effectiveness are simply not there in
the public health sector and in the end there are
chaos. The lack of functioning across the system is
worsened by the fact that we do not have the lead-
ership that understands the importance of func-
tional systems and how much it would save on time
and resources’ (P21).
They added that the governance mechanism of the
parliamentary committee on health is underfunded,
‘meetings of the committee only takes place when parlia-
ment is able to fund the committee’. Governance is not
considered a priority by the MoH and the Government
of Malawi more broadly, ‘having a well-funded and func-
tional committee is not a priority at the moment. Noth-
ing will change in terms of legislative oversight without
additional funding’ (P21).
Arguably, unequal power over the health sector is also
maintained by the MoH’s insistence on oversight of top-
level appointments to the boards/committees of organi-
sations and facilities which receive (partial) government
funding, such as the National AIDS Commission and
Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital (P18, P17). For ex-
ample, in the 2018 HIV and AIDs Act, the MoH
retained the powers to approve high-level appointments
(made by the board) in the National AIDS Commission,
despite this public-private institution being established
in law as independent of the government (P18). This de-
gree of government oversight raises questions about
transparency and the risk of corruption. There were also
concerns about disproportionate influence in the rela-
tionship of the government to health facilities. For in-
stance, when the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital
sought a change in status from government to private or
public-private funding, the government appeared ob-
structive. The preferred option, to become a statutory
corporation (a private-public concern with the govern-
ment as the majority stakeholder), would have required
a new law. It had the support of the public but not the
politicians and no law was enacted, ‘the idea died be-
cause there was no political will to prepare the law and
submit to parliament’ (P17). The issues of delayed pay-
ment to CHAM facilities were also considered political:
‘somehow when it is issues to do with the MoH the pol-
itical part of it you can’t avoid’ (P4).
Donors were perceived as the only health stakeholder
to exert any influence over the government and health
system governance, possibly even requiring the develop-
ment of a strategic framework for the NHP II as a condi-
tion of aid (i.e. the HSSP II) (P2). There was the
widespread perception of greater governance when do-
nors were involved (P8, P15, P18, P21), ‘the challenge in
Malawi is that things only work when there is a donor
funded project which has a higher standard of account-
ability in terms of milestones and reporting’ (P21). Since
the collapse of the Sector wide Approach (SWAp; a
donor-government partnership to map international
funding to the activities of external development part-
ners in Malawi), during which donors had close collab-
oration with the government, there has been less
supervision of health funding (P15). Donors continue to
fund the essential resources of the government’s health-
care facilities (e.g. electricity and water), but these are no
longer paid into a basket fund shared with the govern-
ment via the Ministry of Finance. There are much tigh-
ter controls on their use, with budget lines for specific
organisations/programmes e.g. HIV-specific resources
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for the National AIDS Commission (P18). Due to a dis-
trust of the government, some donors continue to oper-
ate in Malawi but independent of the government:
‘since cashgate, donors do not trust the government
system and cannot transact their resources through
the government system. So far USAID is not open
to cooperating or collaborating with the government
systems, but DFID is more open to collaboration or
harmonisation’ (P1).
The internal governance mechanisms used by donors,
international NGOs and multi-level organisations were
regarded as indirectly affecting healthcare governance.
For example, Oxfam conducts citizen satisfaction sur-
veys to assess the impact of their programmes. These
baseline and monitoring assessments are used to guide
the programme’s strategy and assess its success but are
also used to determine the focus and provide evidence
for their advocacy agenda (P8). Ultimately, it was felt
that the donors had and could have great influence over
governance in the health sector, ‘donors have leverage
because their funds are the lifeline of the health sector.
So, everyone has to listen to their views’ (P8).
Stakeholder engagement
Stakeholders viewed the government as always putting
their agenda ahead of the interests of the service pro-
viders and public (P4, P8, P17). Eleven interviewees
(50%) had some involvement in either the development
or validation of the NHP II and/or the HSSP II. Five
(22.7%) felt this involvement was inadequate as not
enough time was allowed for civil society or local gov-
ernment consultation, or that their involvement was a
government afterthought (P6, P8, P17, P19, P20). As
such, they felt that their priorities (the affordability,
availability and accessibility of health services) were ei-
ther not reflected in these documents or in insufficient
detail (P6, P18). For example, the ‘NAC [National AIDS
Commission] is mentioned in the NHP II and HSSP II,
but only in passing and without much detail as to how
the strategy or plan will manage HIV and AIDS and co-
ordination around it’ (P18).
Efforts were made by the government to consult civil so-
ciety and local government health stakeholders, with the
significant involvement of MHEN (comprised of CSOs)
(P2, P13). Despite this, CSOs that were not consulted re-
ported that ‘the documents do not reflect the voices of pa-
tients’ (P13) and the local government representatives felt
that they had minimal involvement (P19, P20):
‘involvement during the processes for developing
the NHP II and HSSP II mostly happened at the
MoH headquarters level. There were times when
the District Health Office would be involved. Teams
from the ministry headquarters would go to the dis-
tricts with a questionnaire to ask questions related
to policy and strategy. Consultations to finalise the
two documents mostly happened at the Ministry
headquarters’ (P19).
The NHP II and HSSP II were perceived as ‘this is a
MoH thing. It’s also very political’ (P4), ‘[they] are only
political tools which are mentioned in political speeches
to show progress in the health system’ (P21). They were
perceived as developed to appeal to the donors as it was
donor-driven and funded (P1, P18, P21) but there was
little confidence in the implementation of the policy and
strategic plan (P4, P21), especially its ability to deliver
the EHP (the starting point for the move towards UHC):
‘it is all about politics, but little to do with bringing
change to better lives of the poor Malawian. What-
ever the case, what Malawi is promising in the pol-
icy and strategy in terms of the essential health
package, it cannot sustain due to domestic funding
constraints’ (P21).
Discussion
The interviews were conducted around 18 months after
the introduction of the NHP II and HSSP II, the policy
and framework for 2017–2022 which outline the strat-
egies towards achieving UHC. We discuss our results
and their implications for the key leadership and govern-
ance strategies: NHP II Priority Area 2 - Leadership and
Governance; and HSSP II Objective 7 - Improve leader-
ship and governance across the health sector and at all
levels of the health system. Due to the limited literature
on healthcare governance in Malawi (at any level - na-
tional, district, and service), our results can be viewed as
providing both a baseline assessment and an early indi-
cation of progress toward implementing the policy. The
following discussion is a reflection on these government
documents with reference to our findings and other rele-
vant literature, where available.
In the NHP II, the Government of Malawi identified ser-
ious challenges in leadership and governance at all levels
which adversely affect service delivery and other health sys-
tem functions: insufficient capacity (health resources, infra-
structure and research); poor risk management; centralised
decision-making; inadequate community empowerment
(linked to answerability); and poor coordination and enforce-
ment of policies and regulations. The government also iden-
tified inadequate communication and poor coordination
with other health stakeholders (donors, international and na-
tional NGOs and networks, faith-based organisations, CSOs),
resulting in poor alignment of these other stakeholders with
national priorities, fragmented implementation and little
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harmonisation of plans and budgets, including parallel
procurement.
Our findings, which emerged from semi-structured in-
terviews which did not include specific questions about
governance issues, mirror this list. This degree of
consistency highlights the considerable awareness of
both the government and health stakeholders of the
challenges to service delivery and health system
strengthening as well as the central importance of gov-
ernance to health system efficiency and achieving UHC.
Accountability and influence
There is widespread recognition that greater social ac-
countability supports more responsive health policies and
more effective services, and of the need for leadership to
drive the strengthening of governance in the health sector
[9, 41]. Social accountability means building answerability
through the engagement and direct or indirect participa-
tion of citizens/the public. To work effectively, account-
ability requires openness, dialogue, enforceability
(ensuring an action is taken and consequences or remed-
ies for a failure to do so), honesty and responsiveness on
the part of politicians, policy-makers, and providers to ex-
plain and justify their actions) [42].
In Malawi, the need for greater accountability comes
from a demand for demonstrable results (improvements
in health outcomes) and funding relationships i.e. where
public money is being spent it must be accounted for
[9]. Where funding is provided by external development
partners (i.e. donors) effective governance is also
demanded and implemented. In the HSSP II, the govern-
ment admits that ‘there was mixed progress with respect
to governance of the health sector over the past five
years’ (the 2013–2017 period of the NHP I and HSSP I)
(p18). To ensure progress over the following 5 years, the
NHP II and HSSP II outline performance indicators and
activities that can be monitored to achieve the necessary
improvements in leadership and governance.
The NHP II includes a table of performance indicators
(the monitoring and evaluation plan) to meet the object-
ive of improving leadership and governance across the
health sector. The baseline and measurable targets for
each of the eight performance indicators are stated with
requirements and assumptions/risks to achieving them.
For example, by 2030 every central hospital will have
achieved autonomy from the government. This requires
a hospital board (verifiable via the annual Health Sector
Reform Report), ‘(sustained) willingness to foster govern-
ance and accountability’, the availability of resources,
and decentralisation. However, in our interviews, it was
reported that efforts by Queen Elizabeth Central Hos-
pital to seek greater autonomy had been obstructed by
the government. In the NHP II and HSSP II, and
reflected in the concerns of the interviewees, there is no
guidance on how this culture of governance and ac-
countability will be fostered and sustained or who will
be responsible for monitoring the performance indica-
tors, at what intervals and any sanctions available for
enforcement.
It is possible that a lack of leadership and accountabil-
ity from staff at the service level may be hampering
achievement of the specific targets related to healthcare
facilities [40]; however the interviewees were more con-
cerned by the apparent lack of government-led leader-
ship and oversight in the implementation of policies and
felt limited in their ability to hold the government to ac-
count for their (in) actions. They identified tokenistic
public engagement in government health decision-
making, such as via the TWGs which are responsible for
providing leadership and governance on health issues at
the central level. A review of the functionality and effect-
iveness of the TWGs is specified in the HSSP II imple-
mentation plan (to achieve Objective 7) as an activity for
the first 12 months (2017–18). The government ac-
knowledges that ‘the activity and quality of guidance
provided by TWGs has varied considerably with some
meeting monthly while others have been inactive’ (p18).
Our findings show that these TWGs sometimes include
representatives from civil society and faith-based organi-
sations but frequently stakeholder groups felt unrepre-
sented or their contributions were undervalued. There
was no indication from our data that this review had
been completed, certainly none that the health stake-
holders were involved, or that any recommendations had
been implemented. Without a model of co-governance
[43], whereby both top-down leadership drive and moni-
tor the requirements and effective social accountability
mechanisms to hold the government to account for their
(in) actions, it is hard to see how the government can
meet their performance indicators within the specified
time period or at all.
The activities included in the 12month implementation
plan largely review the existing processes and develop
guideline documents and monitoring infrastructure (e.g.
to develop and implement an improved financial record
keeping system and develop a Health Sector Aid
Harmonization Manual). This focus on administrative and
supportive systems may explain why our interviewees did
not report improvements in governance or service deliv-
ery. The planned construction of new District Hospitals in
five districts and 900 Health Posts is part of a longer term
(5 year) plan (although none of the interviewees men-
tioned planned new facilities). Alternatively, the first year
activities may not yet have been achieved and the associ-
ated guidelines disseminated. For example, a listed activity
is ‘to develop a document explicitly outlining district gov-
ernance structures providing clarity on roles, membership
and linkages including developing and disseminating
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terms of reference for decentralised governance structures’
(p77). One interviewee explicitly stated that they had re-
ceived no guidance on the role and composition of the
health resource allocation committee mandated by the
MoH to the district level. This may imply a delay in
achieving or issues disseminating the outputs of the first
12month plan. Communication between the government
and health stakeholders is identified as both desirable and
a challenge in the NHP II, but it appears that no meaning-
ful progress has been made.
Concerns about the fragmentation of healthcare
caused by a lack of coordination between government
and donor policies and programmes are raised in the
NHP II. This leads to duplication and inefficiency and
makes it harder for the government to have oversight
over the health system. The MoH established the Aid
Coordination Unit in 2016 to minimise financing and
activity duplication by ensuring alignment of health
stakeholders to the HSSP II’s objectives and strategies.
Based on our interviews, the situation does not appear
to have improved since 2016. The interviewees indicated
a desire for greater communication with the government
but a deep mistrust of their ability to generate the condi-
tions for greater collaboration. They doubted the gov-
ernment’s willingness (and sometimes ability due to
limited resources) to meaningfully consult and imple-
ment the recommendations of health stakeholders (via
adequate answerability processes) [41]. The government
states in the HSSP II, that there are some local oversight
institutions, with stakeholder coordination mechanisms
established by the District Health Offices but that these
governance bodies are not very functional. In the ab-
sence of adequate government-led governance, service-
providers and CSOs together with NGOs and donors are
implementing their own accountability mechanisms; al-
though the interviewees felt that only donors had true
influence with the government, even insisting on the de-
velopment of the HSSP II as a precondition to aid. How-
ever, even then, doubts were raised by the interviewees
and in the literature over the government’s willingness
to improve governance sufficiently to regain donor con-
fidence and work collaboratively [10, 44].
Resource management
The HSSP II attempts to plan more realistically than the
first iteration of the HSSP, but ‘there are still large re-
source gaps and optimistic targets in all areas of the health
system’ (p58). This seems to serve as a disclaimer for not
achieving the overall objectives and specific targets within
the 2017–2022 timeframe. An overarching issue faced by
the government is the need for additional funds to im-
prove governance (e.g. to pay for information manage-
ment systems, to hold regular meetings of governance
bodies and to ensure timely payment of service-providers
according to the SLAs).
The HSSP II includes a costing for the activities re-
quired to deliver the EHP together with the resources to
strengthen the health system (including health resources,
health information systems and governance). The activ-
ities required to achieve Objective 7 require 2,220,287
USD in the first year (2017/18), decreasing each subse-
quent year. This equates to 0% of the total 5 year budget,
and the MoH notes that the budget continues to out-
strip the resources. The fiscal deficit inhibits greater gov-
ernance, whilst poor governance accentuates the deficit.
For example, through allowing leakage in the drug sup-
ply, understaffing in health facilities, and unnecessary
duplication of management and services at national and
local levels. The government hopes that improved gov-
ernance will improve the fiscal space (the budgetary
room available to a government to provide resources for
public needs without affecting fiscal sustainability) [45].
It is our concern that where cost savings must be made,
the governance activities will continue to be inadequate,
as already appears to be the case 18 months after the
introduction of the HSSP II.
The government has long recognised the need for im-
proved financial management, but their ability to enact
the Financial Management Improvement Plan (FMIP)
formulated in 2012 was itself hampered by insufficient
resources - the limited number of skilled staff and infor-
mation technology equipment affected the capacity of
the MoH finance department. The Internal Audit Unit
was created in 2008 to improve the accountability of
public resources and reduce the risk of corruption and
financial mismanagement in the government-funded
health system [46]. However, the government reports
that the Internal Audit Unit for the MoH was unable to
conduct visits to health facilities due to insufficient fund-
ing which limited staff and equipment capacity, prevent-
ing it from performing its governance function.
Insufficient funding also prevents the procurement plans
produced each year from being implemented, resulting
in ad hoc procurement and the accumulation of arrears.
This is a probable cause of the fragmented procurement
in the health system reported by the interviewees,
whereby local government and service-providers seek as-
sistance from their own preferred suppliers and donors
as they cannot rely on the government’s procurement
and supply systems.
The HSSP II outlines how the health system will be
strengthened to support the delivery of the EHP (in the
move towards UHC by 2030). A key strategy is to priori-
tise filling staff vacancies that deliver the EHP [47]. The
interviewees were particularly concerned that the con-
centrated focus on the EHP risks increasing rather than
decreasing inequalities in health as some groups would
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be further marginalised (e.g. LGBT populations). The
government acknowledges that difficult decisions regard-
ing the conditions to prioritise for the EHP were made
and continue to be as:
‘despite the cost of the revised EHP [outlined in the
HSSP II] being closer to the resources available for
its provision than before, the cost continues to out-
strip resources. The result of this is that, even as-
suming no health system constraints, it will not be
possible to deliver the new EHP to the entire popu-
lation in need. It is important that ongoing dis-
course around the EHP focuses on the budgets
available for its provision’ [47].
This stance makes it unlikely that government-funded
bodies (other than the NAC) will be able to access top-
up funding or that the government will be able to plug
gaps in the service provision and drug availability at the
district and city assembly levels, both issues identified by
the interviewees.
We note that the coronavirus pandemic has occurred
since the publication of this document. The Malawian
government response has to balance the risk of adopting
a ‘lockdown’ policy prioritising the protection of health
and the health system versus the economy, particularly
considering the potentially severe impact of closing es-
sential facilities (e.g. market places) on people already
living in poverty [48]. Without considerable external as-
sistance and collaboration between health stakeholders
and possibly an intersectoral approach, the EHP
(let alone UHC) will be undeliverable and existing in-
equalities in health and healthcare access will rise (espe-
cially if user fees are introduced) [19, 49–51].
Limitations
A range of stakeholders from different organisation types
were recruited to the study, but there were more repre-
sentatives from civil society than the other organisation
types. All stakeholder perceptions were reported regard-
less of the number of participants to comment on each
issue, issues of greater importance for CSOs may have
been over-reported. Interviews were conducted with
stakeholders based in Lilongwe and Blantyre but drew
on their experience of both urban and rural healthcare
in these districts, and from projects in other districts
such as Karonga and Salima. As the stakeholders chose
to be interviewed in their places of work, the location
was not perceived to constrain, and thus potentially bias,
the conversation, especially as anonymity had been as-
sured. The need to protect the identities of the inter-
viewees limited the transferability [52]. The semi-
structured interview approach, with a focus on open-
ended questions, increased the breadth of the data col-
lected but reduced the repeatability of the study.
The interviews were recorded via field notes and tran-
scripts which were not participant-verified. Although
guidelines for making field notes were followed, it was
impossible to completely mitigate the risk of interviewer
subjectivity in the recording and transcription of the
field notes [52]. The interviewer was considered largely
free of preconceptions about the health system and
healthcare governance as they had not previously
worked in the health sector and had lived outside
Malawi for some time. Instead, their Malawian national-
ity and health sector ‘outsider’ status may have enabled
the interviewees to express their opinions more openly.
There were no concerns that the conversations were
biased by the apparent knowledge of some of the inter-
viewees of the Thanzi la Onse project, of which this
study is part [45].
The governance issues identified by the participants,
and examples given, may pre-date the NHP II and HSSP
II. However, as the interviewees also identified current
and ongoing efforts to address the challenges, the gov-
ernance issues were considered outstanding at the point
of the interview (unless otherwise stated).
Conclusions
This exploratory study captured a diverse range of stake-
holder perspectives on health system functioning, and
through the lens of healthcare governance in Malawi,
gives an overview of challenges to the achievement of
UHC in low income countries in this critical decade
running up to 2030. Our findings suggest that the Gov-
ernment of Malawi, via the NHP II and HSSP II, is mak-
ing policy and strategic efforts to improve governance in
the health system at all levels. However, 18 months after
the publication of these documents, health sector stake-
holders have seen little improvement in key areas of gov-
ernance: accountability, stakeholder engagement in
decision-making, and health resources. Our findings
highlight ongoing challenges to the government’s aim to
improve healthcare governance and strengthen the
health system which, without greater leadership and in-
vestment in governance mechanisms (including policy
monitoring and enforcement), are preventing delivery of
the EHP and will prevent achievement of UHC. Involv-
ing stakeholders, even when their views are uncomfort-
able for governments and highlight governance failures,
will lead to better services.
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